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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

PROVO CITY,

Case No.

940717- CA

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
FRANK LIFANG,

Category No. 2

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdictional authority
pursuant to § 78-2(a)-3 (2) (d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Whether the Utah Stalking Statute, U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5
(Repl. 1995), is violative of the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution because it is vague and overbroad both facially and
as applied to the defendant?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The defendant, Frank Lifang, was charged by the City of
Provo with stalking, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (Repl. 1995) and Provo City Ordinance
9-76-5-106.5.
The Honorable Judge Stephen L. Hansen, Judge of the Fourth
1

Judicial District Court, Provo Department, State of Utah ordered
a psychological evaluation of the Defendant.

The Defendant was

evaluated and found competent to stand trial.
The Defendant, by and through his counsel of record
submitted a motion to dismiss, alleging that the Utah Stalking
Statute, codified in U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.

The parties appeared before Judge Hansen on

September 20, 1994 for a non-jury trial.

Having heard the

testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel at trial, on
October 11, 1994, the court issued a ruling which denied the
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, found the State had met its burden
of proof, and found the Defendant guilty of the crime of
stalking.
The Defendant, by and through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal on November 15, 1994.

STATEMENT OP PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the decision of the Honorable Judge
Stephen L. Hansen, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo Department, State
of Utah, rendered on October 11, 1994. The Defendant appeals
both the trial court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss and its
verdict of guilty.

STATEMENT OP THE PACTS
(All references are to the transcript of the trial as such
transcript has been paginated by the certified shorthand
2

reporter.)

The Defendant, Mr. Frank Lifang, was charged with stalking
Mrs. Kelly Roring subsequent to a confrontation instituted by the
Defendant between himself and Mrs. Roring that took place at the
Physician's Plaza, at the Utah Valley Regional Medical Center in
Provo, Utah, on May 26, 1994 (page 51). The Defendant and Mrs.
Roring became acquainted when they were both employed at the
Provo Care Center in Provo, Utah in January of 1991 (page 17).
After the Defendant's employment at the Provo Care Center
terminated in April or May of 1991, he continued to maintain
contact with Mrs. Roring, including calling her house (page 25),
hiding in her yard (31), and leaving threatening notes on her car
(page 39), which behavior culminated in a confrontation on May
26, 1994 (page 51).
Mr. and Mrs. Roring both testified that they had told the
Defendant to stay away from Mrs. Roring (page 31, page 84).

On

April 14, 1994 the Defendant was served by Mrs. Roring's attorney
with a copy of a Permanent Injunction enjoining the Defendant
from bothering, harassing, or annoying Mr. or Mrs. Roring (page
127).

The Defendant testified that he understood he was not

supposed to have any contact with Mr. or Mrs. Roring, but
initiated contact subsequent to the issuance of the injunction
anyway (page 246-47).
On May 26, 1994 at 10:30 a.m., Mrs. Roring was crossing the
parking lot at the Physicians Plaza when the Defendant approached
3

her from behind (page 53). The Defendant began swearing at Mrs.
Roring, shouting, and throwing his arms about (page 53-54).

At

one point he told Mrs. Roring he was willing to die over this
matter and he was going to take someone with him (page 55) the
Defendant's words and actions were such that another employee in
the parking lot was alarmed and notified hospital security (page
154) .
The security officer that responded testified at trial that
he interpreted the Defendant's conduct as threatening (page 165).
A Provo police officer who also responded to the call testified
that when he arrived the Defendant was agitated (page 176) and
Mrs. Roring was very upset by the incident (page 177). The
officer invited the Defendant to come down to the police station,
the Defendant agreed, and the officer read him his Miranda rights
(page 178-79).

The officer took the Defendant's statement (page

180-83), during which the Defendant again made the statement that
if he was going to die, he would take someone with him (page
182) .
The officer interviewed the Rorings on the following day,
obtained police reports from Orem regarding the Defendant, and
spoke with the Defendant's probation officer (page 183). Based
on his investigation, the officer charged the Defendant with
stalking under Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5.

SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Stalking Statute is not overbroad because it does
4

not make a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
activity unlawful.

The Appellant lacks the standing to mount a

facial overbreadth challenge because he is not alleging the
statute is overbroad as applied to his circumstances.

He cannot

make a facial overbreadth challenge under a First Amendment
standing exception either because he has not shown that the
statute implicates a substantial amount of First Amendment
protected speech.

Even if the Appellant has the standing for a

facial overbreadth challenge, he has failed to carry his burden
of proving that the overbreadth of the statute is real and
substantial.
The Utah Stalking Statute is also not unconstitutionally
vague, because it defines in terms an ordinary person would
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute.

The

Appellant cannot claim the statute is vague in relation to his
own conduct because his conduct falls clearly within the
legitimate application of the statute.

The statute is also not

facially vague because the statute has a specific intent
requirement, a reasonable person standard, and concrete terms
describing prohibited conduct.
Other states with stalking statutes have also heard
challenges to those statute's constitutionality on grounds of
overbreadth and vagueness.

The vast majority of the states have

upheld their statutes in the face of these challenges. Because
Utah's Stalking Statute is neither overbroad nor vague, it does
not violate the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
5

United States and Utah Constitutions.

ARGUMENT

I.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 76-5-106.5 HAS THREE COMPONENTS FOR A
DEFENDANT TO BE HELD CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR STALKING.

A.

The Act Component

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (2)(a) says:
A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of
conduct directed at a specific person. . . Id. at (2)(a).
To be held criminally liable under § 76-5-106.5, a defendant must
have done something voluntary.

By designating certain types of

acts as stalking and requiring the state to prove that the
defendant performed these acts, the legislature assures that the
person being charged with stalking is not merely a bystander, but
a criminal actor.
The legislature further identified acts which constitute
stalking by including a definition of "course of conduct" in the
statute.

It defines "course of conduct" as:

repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity
to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written
threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination
thereof directed at or toward a person. Id. at (1)(a).
This definition gives specific notice of what types of acts will
make the defendant criminally culpable.

B.

The Threat Component

6

The threat component of the Utah stalking statute is found
within the definition of "course of conduct" cited above.

Id.

It is not an additional requirement to the act component, but is
an alternative manner of fulfilling the "course of conduct"
portion of the act component.

To fulfill the act component, a

defendant can either maintain a visual or physical proximity to
the victim, or he can convey a threat to the victim.

The threat

component requires that a defendant communicate a verbal,
written, implied by conduct, or combination threat to a specific
person.
This requirement helps to "remove innocent and
constitutionally protected activity from the scope of the
statute."

M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws

Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769,
779 (1994).

Because a threat may subject a defendant to criminal

liability under some other statutes, including it in the stalking
statute helps to eliminate vagueness problems the statute might
face.

See e.g.r U.C.A. § 76-5-102 (Repl. 1995) (criminal assault

is a threat accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence), U.C.A. § 76-5-106 (Repl. 1995) (criminal harassment is
communicating in writing a threat to commit any violent felony),
U.C.A. § 76-5-107 (Repl. 1995) (penalty for threat against life
or property).

C.

The Intent Component

7

U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 requires two types of intent:
and specific.

general

General intent requires only that the "offender's

actions be voluntary." M. Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws
Unconstitutionally Vague or Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769,
779-80 (1994).

The "intentionally" or "knowingly" language of

the Utah statute indicates the general intent requirement.

M.

Katherine Boychuk, Are Stalking Laws Unconstitutionally Vaaue or
Overbroad?, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 769, 779-80 (1994).

The

"intentionally" or "knowingly" language in the Utah statute
comprises the general intent requirement.
(2) (a) (Repl. 1995).

U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5

By requiring the state to prove the

defendant acted intentionally or knowingly, the legislature
assures that the statute is not going to proscribe merely
reckless or negligent conduct.

To be criminally liable, the

defendant has to voluntarily engage in the course of conduct
prohibited by the stalking statute.
Specific intent is a "special mental element that goes
beyond that required with respect to the offenders actions. . . .
[it] requires that the offender have an additional culpable
mental state."

Boychuk, at 780.

The Utah stalking statute's

specific intent requirement is encompassed in the language
requiring the defendant to engage in a course of conduct
"directed at a specific person" with the knowledge that the
specific person will "be placed in reasonable fear of bodily
injury" or "will suffer emotional distress".
(2) (b) (I)-(ii) (Repl. 1995).

U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5

By requiring that the defendant's
8

actions be directed toward a specific person, with the intent
that his actions cause a particular effect, the defendant can be
presumed to be on notice that his actions constitute a crime.

II. U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT MAKE UNLAWFUL A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OP
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY.

A. Standard of Review
When an appeal rests solely on questions of law regarding
the constitutionality of a statute, the appellate court gives "no
particular deference to the rulings of the circuit and district
courts on any of the points presented.11

Provo City Corp. v.

Willden 768 P. 2d 455, 456 (Utah 1989).

However, in deciding for

itself the constitutionality of U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5, the
appellate court must accord a strong deference to the statute
because "legislative enactments are presumed to be
constitutional." Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake 817 P. 2d
816, 819 (Utah 1991).

Because of this presumption of

constitutionality, the appellant bears "the burden of
demonstrating its unconstitutionality."

B.

Id.

Facial Overbreadth

An appellant challenging the constitutionality of a statute
because of its overbreadth may allege either that the statute is
overbroad in respect to the particular appellant's conduct, or
that it is facially overbroad and chills the exercise of
9

constitutionally protected activities.

The appellant in this

case does not specifically allege that his conduct was
constitutionally protected and that the Utah stalking statute
unconstitutionally made unlawful that conduct.

Instead, this

appellant attempts to mount a facial overbreadth challenge to the
statute, claiming that the statute "proscribes activities that
are clearly constitutional under basic free speech rights."
(Brief for Appellant at 10).

l.

The defendant lacKg standing f<?r a facial
overbreadth challenge.

To claim facial overbreadth, the appellant must first
establish his standing to make the challenge.

The traditional

rule regarding standing in constitutional adjudication is
described by the Supreme Court in Broadrick v. Oklahomaf 413 U.S.
601 (1973) when it states that:
a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on
the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, in other situations not
before the Court. Id. at 410.
The appellant is not arguing that the statute cannot be
constitutionally applied to him.

Instead he creates a

hypothetical situation involving a service provider and a
dissatisfied client where the statute might be unconstitutionally
prohibitive of constitutionally protected activities.

(Brief for

Appellant at 10).
The appellant might have standing to adjudicate the
potential claims of those not before the court if the overbreadth
10

challenge falls within one of the exceptions provided by the
Supreme Court.

This exception that the appellant is claiming is

the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine.

(Brief for Appellant

at 7). This doctrine is based on the "sensitive nature of
protected expression."

New York v. Ferberr 458 U.S. 747, 768

(1982).
To properly invoke the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine,
however, the defendant must first show that constitutionally
protected First Amendment speech is involved.

If a substantial

amount of constitutionally protected conduct is not at issue,
then the facial overbreadth challenge must fail.

Village of

Hoffman Estates Vt Flipside, Hoffman Estates, inc., 455 u.s. 489,
494 (1982).
The Supreme Court said these types of overbreadth
challenges are usually "entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate 'only spoken words.1"
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973) quoting Gooding
v. Wilson 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).

They also might be allowed

where "rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by
their broad sweep, might result in burdening innocent
associations."

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).

Neither of these First Amendment rights is implicated in the
Utah Stalking Statute.

The Utah statute does not regulate speech

alone, but speech accompanied by conduct.

The statute's

definition includes "repeatedly conveying verbal or written
threats," U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (1) (a), but the mere utterance of
11

these words is not enough to create liability under the statute.
The words must be accompanied by conduct in the form of
addressing them to a specific person with the intent or knowledge
of causing that person to fear injury or suffer emotional
distress.

Id. at (2) (a)-(c).

Even if a defendant could be convicted of stalking by merely
uttering the words, with no additional conduct involved, the
types of words he would utter—threats—are not constitutionally
protected speech.

Threats have not been specifically identified

as a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment.

See, etgt, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 u.s. 568 (1942)
(fighting words), Miller V, California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(obscenity), Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
(libel), Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement).
However, conveying a threat has been criminalized in other
statutes, so a potential defendant is unlikely to feel the
stalking statute significantly chills the exercise of speech
which is otherwise criminal.

See, e.g., U.C.A. § 76-5-102

(criminal assault), U.C.A. § 76-5-106 (criminal harassment),
U.C.A. § 76-5-107 (threat against life or property).
The Utah Stalking Statute also does not burden innocent
associations to the extent that a facial overbreadth challenge is
warranted.

The Appellant claims the statute could be construed

to include innocent associations with people we regularly come in
contact with.

(Brief for Appellant at 10). However, the intent

requirement of the Utah Stalking Statute would take these types
12

of innocent associations out of the purview of the statute.

The

Utah stalking statute requires both a specific and a general
intent to commit the acts constituting the elements of the crime.

See supra, i.e..
By requiring the course of conduct to be intentional and
specifically directed at a particular person, someone who simply
maintains a coincidental physical or visual proximity to a
particular person, with no intent or knowledge to maintain that
proximity or cause the person to fear injury or suffer emotional
distress is not going to be criminally liable under U.C.A. § 765-106.5.
Since the Utah Stalking Statute does not significantly
constrict First Amendment speech or association rights, the
Appellant has no basis for mounting a facial overbreadth
challenge.

If the Appellant is not alleging that the statute is

overbroad in its application to his circumstances, and the
statute does not touch any First Amendment protected activities,
then the Appellant has no standing to challenge the statute
either for himself or for others not before the court.

2.

If the Appellant has standing to make a facial

overbreadth challenge to the statute, he hag
failed tQ meet hig burden of dewQngtrating the
statute's unconstitutionality.
Even if the court determines that some First Amendment
protected activities are implicated in the operation of the Utah
Stalking Statute, warranting a facial overbreadth challenge, the
13

Defendant has not met his significant burden of proving the
statute is unconstitutionally overbroad.
The Supreme Court has held that the facial overbreadth
doctrine is "strong medicine" and has been "employed by the Court
sparingly and only as a last resort."
U.S. 601, 613 (1973).

Broadrick v. Oklahoma 413

The Appellant must prove that a

"substantial" amount of constitutionally protected activity is
being proscribed by the statute in order to overcome the
statute's presumption of constitutionality.

Village of Hoffman

Estate? Vt Flipside, HQffman Estate?, Inc., 455 u.s. 489, 494
(1982).

In addition, the Superior Court of Connecticut in State

v. Culmof 642 A. 2d 90 (1993), where a defendant challenged the
constitutionality of Connecticut's stalking statute, found that
the state's interest in criminalizing stalking was a compelling
interest.

Id. at 101.

In fact, the court said that "[p]roviding

protection from stalking conduct is at the heart of the state's
social contract with its citizens".

Id. at 102.

In light of the state's interest in protecting its citizens
and in not having every statute subjected to a constitutional
challenge, the Broadrick Court established a threshold standard
the appellant must meet in a facial overbreadth challenge.

The

Court said that:
particularly where conduct and not merely speech is
involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute
must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged
in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).

14

In Broadrickr which involved a challenge to an Oklahoma law which
prohibited state employees from certain political activities, the
Supreme Court found that the "strong medicine11 of a facial
overbreadth invalidation was not warranted.

The majority held

that "whatever overbreadth may exist should be cured through
case-by-case analysis of the fact situations to which its
sanctions, assertedly, may not be applied."

Id. at 615-16.

To succeed in a facial overbreadth challenge the Appellant
must prove that the Utah Stalking Statute is substantially
overbroad and that no limiting construction can be placed on the
statute.

Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).

The

Appellant has not met his substantial burden in failing to
provide the court with evidence that the Utah Stalking Statute's
overbreadth is real and substantial.
The Appellant has posed a hypothetical scenario in an
attempt to meet that burden, but the scenario does not describe
constitutionally protected conduct that would be criminally
proscribed by the stalking statute.

(Brief for Appellant at 10).

The Appellant's scenario indicates that if a dissatisfied client
of a service provider repeatedly complains about the quality of
the service to the provider, knowing or intending the result to
be emotional distress, then the client could be criminally liable
for stalking.

The Appellant is correct in his determination that

under the statute this type of behavior would constitute
stalking.

However, the Appellant is incorrect in assuming that

this behavior is constitutionally protected.
15

A person who

repeatedly and intentionally or knowingly maintains a visual or
physical proximity or communicates a threat, whether their reason
for doing so is because of a relationship gone awry, or because
they are dissatisfied with a good or service, does not have a
constitutionally protected right to intentionally or knowingly
cause another person to fear bodily injury or suffer emotional
distress.

While a dissatisfied client has the right to complain

about goods or services, the Utah Stalking Statute requires that
the conduct reach the level such that a reasonable person would
fear bodily injury or suffer emotional distress before it
constitutes a criminal action.
In addition to failing to present any credible evidence that
the statute's overbreadth is real and substantial, the Appellant
has also failed to prove that any limiting construction the court
could put on the statute would be insufficient to cure its
overbreadth.
The language of the Utah Stalking Statute itself provides
the court with the limiting construction it needs to assure that
the statute is applied only to the type of conduct the
legislature found odious enough to criminalize and not to
innocent, constitutionally protected conduct.

The statute

requires the fact finder to determine that a defendant's conduct
in repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity or
communicating a threat to a specific person be such that a
reasonable person would fear bodily injury or suffer emotional
distress from the conduct.

U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (2) (a) (I)-(ii)
16

(Repl. 1995).

It is not enough for the fact finder to determine

that the victim actually did suffer emotional distress or fear
bodily injury; if a reasonable person would not have reached the
same conclusions about the defendant's conduct, then the
defendant committed no criminal act.

3.

Other jurisdictions have upheld their stalking
statutes in actions alleging facial
unconstitutionality.

In City of Dayton v. Smith, 646 N.E. 2d 917 (Ohio Mun. 1994)
the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the charges
against him for stalking, stating that the defendant had not
shown the Ohio stalking statute included a substantial amount of
protected conduct.

Id. at 920.

Likewise, in other, earlier cases in Florida, Virginia, and
Connecticut, the courts have held those states' stalking statutes
are not unconstitutionally overbroad.

The Florida appellate

court in Pallas v. State 636 So. 2d 1358 (1994) questioned the
defendant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge, but
concluded that even if he did have standing, the statute was not
overbroad in its use of the term "follows" as an element of the
offense of stalking.

Id. at 1364. The court said the term

"follows" is "directed primarily at conduct, not First Amendment
expression."

Id.

Therefore, the court found that this portion

of the statute did not meet the Broadrick standard of real and
substantial overbreadth which outweighed the statute's legitimate
sweep.

Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Virginia also upheld that state's
stalking statute against an overbreadth challenge in Woolfolk v.
Commonwealth 447 S.E. 2d 530 (1994).

In response to the

defendant's claim that the Virginia Stalking Statute is broad
enough to reach constitutionally protected activities, the court
employed a narrowing construction to the statute.

Id. at 852.

The court decided to construe the statute as proscribing only
conduct, with no legitimate purpose, engaged in with the intent
to cause emotional distress by putting the victim in fear of
death or bodily injury.

Id.

The court said such a narrowing

construction is "not strained and prevents the possibility of
overbreadth."

Id.

The Superior Court of Connecticut in State v. Culmo, 642 A.
2d 90 (1993) denied the defendant standing to raise a facial
overbreadth challenge because the court said he had not met the
threshold requirement of proving that the statute regulated
expression and not merely conduct.

Id. at 103.

Since the First

Amendment protects speech and not conduct, which is subject to
regulation by the state, when a statute proscribes intentional
conduct and not speech, there is no basis for a facial invalidity
challenge.

Id.

More recently, in Culbreath v. State, 1995 WL 217573 (1995),
the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals evaluated its stalking
statute in light of case law from other jurisdictions and other
research, and found the statute not unconstitutionally overbroad.
Id. at 6.

The court noted that the Alabama statute's resembled
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the California statute in requiring an intent, a threat, and an
act,

III. THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
EITHER FACIALLY OR AS APPLIED TO THIS DEPENDANT BECAUSE IT
CLEARLY DEFINES WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED.
After the court decides on the facial overbreadth challenge,
if it fails, then the court should turn to the facial vagueness
challenge to a statute.

The Supreme Court in Village of Hoffman

Estates Vi Flipside, Hoffman Estates, inc T , 455 u.s. 489 (1982)
says after the court turns to this facial vagueness challenge:
assuming the enactment implicates no constitutionally
protected conduct, [the court] should uphold the
challenge only if the enactment is impermissibly vague
in all of its applications. A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain
of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others. Id. at 494-95.
Because the Court requires standing to raise a vagueness
challenge, the Court said it should first "examine the
complainant's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical
applications of the law."

Id.

If this Court, in determining the validity of the
Defendant's overbreadth challenge, decides that no First
Amendment rights are implicated in the operation of the statute,
then the Defendant must prove the statute is vague in all
circumstances, including the Defendant's.

Regardless of whether

or not the court finds First Amendment rights at issue, it should
consider first the statute as it applies to the Defendant's
conduct before considering other, hypothetical circumstances.
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A.

The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Impermissibly Vague as
Applied to This Defendant

The Supreme Court defined the void-for-vagueness doctrine as
requiring that a criminal statute "define the criminal offense
with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited"•
357 (1983).

Kolender v. Lawson 461 U.S. 352,

To prove that the Utah Stalking Statute is vague as

applies to him, the Defendant would have to show that the statute
did not alert him that his actions were criminally prohibited.
The Defendant in this case can make no such claim.

His

conduct is of the type clearly proscribed by the statute.

The

Defendant's conduct in visually and physically maintaining a
close proximity to the victim was not only in violation of the
Utah Stalking Statute, it was also in violation of a permanent
injunction.

The Defendant testified that he understood from the

victim's attorney that he was to have no contact with the victim.
(Transcript at 244) . But even knowing this, he also testified
that he intentionally initiated contact with the victim after he
had knowledge that he was not to have any contact with her.
(Transcript at 245).
Having admitted that he intentionally contacted the victim
after he knew he was legally prohibited from doing so, the
Defendant cannot claim that his conduct was innocent or that he
did not know the conduct was prohibited.

The language of the

permanent injunction says the Defendant has agreed "to be
permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying,
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threatening or harming" the victim.

(Judgment Granting Permanent

Injunction at 2, see attached addendum).

It also states that the

Defendant agrees that he may be "restrained from coming in, onf
or around the plaintiff's residence, place or employment or any
place where plaintiff may be present."

(Judgment Granting

Permanent Injunction at 2, see attached addendum).

The

Defendant's actions in violating the Permanent Injunction are
clearly proscribed by the stalking statute.

Therefore, he cannot

claim that the same conduct he knew was proscribed by the
Injunction was not sufficiently described in the stalking statute
to put him on notice that the conduct was proscribed by the
statute.
To challenge a statute for vagueness, which does not
implicate constitutionally protected conduct, the Defendant must
prove that the statute is "impermissibly vague in all of its
applications."

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 (1982).

If the Defendant cannot

prove that the statute is vague regarding his own conduct, that
his conduct does not fall within the clear proscriptions of the
statute, then his vagueness challenge must fail.

B.

The Utah Stalking Statute Is Not Facially Vague
To avoid a vagueness challenge, a statute must be

worded such that: (1) an ordinarily intelligent person has a
reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, and
(2) it provides explicit standards so that the statute cannot be
21

applied arbitrarily or discriminatorily by law enforcement.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).

The

concern if statutes are worded too vaguely is that if the
ordinary person is not sure what conduct will be criminal, their
uncertainty might inhibit the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms.

Id. at 109.

In analyzing a statute for vagueness, however, the courts
have acknowledged the strong presumption of validity of a statute
and the dilemma of the legislature.

The Florida District Court

of Appeals describes this dilemma as, "to draft with narrow
particularity is to risk nullification by easy evasion of the
legislative purpose; to draft with great generality is to risk
ensnarement of the innocent in a net designed for others."
Pallas v. Statef 636 So. 2d 1358, 1360 (1994).

Because of this

dilemma, the Florida court said the Supreme Court "will not
ordinarily invalidate a statute because some marginal offenses
may remain within the scope of a statute's language."

Id.

(quoting Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 12-31,
at 1033-34 (2d ed. 1988).
The Utah Stalking Statute explains clearly, in terms the
average person can understand what actions constitute the crime
of stalking.

The statutefs requirement of a specific intent

assures that the average person will not accidentally be
criminally liable for seeing the same person on the street twice
as the Appellant claims (Brief for Appellant at 12). If the
state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has
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a specific intent to keep the victim in physical or visual
proximity and cause them to fear bodily injury or suffer
emotional distress, then the person has not engaged in criminally
proscribed conduct.

The Connecticut Superior Court in State v.

Culmo 642 A. 2d 90 (1993) said that the specific intent
requirement in their state's stalking statute "significantly
vitiates any claim that its purported vagueness could mislead a
person of common intelligence into misunderstanding what is
prohibited."

Id. at 98.

The reasonable person standard of section 76-5-106.5 also
eliminates any claims to vagueness.

The state must prove that a

reasonable person would, based on the defendant's course of
conduct, fear bodily injury or suffer emotional distress.
§ 76-5-106.5 (2)(a) (I)-(ii) (Repl. 1995).

U.C.A.

This requirement

eliminates the possibility of subjectivity in enforcement of the
law because it is an objective standard.

If an alleged victim

reacts unreasonably to ordinary contact, then an ordinary person
who maintains a visual or physical proximity with the alleged
victim, even if that proximity is intentional, will not be
criminally liable under the statute.

The reasonable person

standard assures that the individual's right to free association
is not constrained by the statute.
The terms of the Utah Stalking Statute are also
significantly concrete enough to withstand vagueness allegations.
Other states' stalking statutes have been challenged for
vagueness because of their use of terms such as "harass" or
23

"follow".

See, <3tgt, Pallas v. State. 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla.

Dist. ct. App. 1994), cvtlbreath v. State, 1995 W L 217573 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1995).

However, Utah's statute employs terms that are

substantially more concrete.

Rather than "follows", Utah uses

the phrase "repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical
proximity."

U.C.A. § 76-5-106.5 (1) (a) (Repl. 1995).

Rather

than "harasses", Utah uses the phrase "intentionally or knowingly
engages in a course of conduct".

Id. at (2) (a).

The Utah Legislature, in drafting section 76-5-106.5 must
have anticipated potential vagueness challenges.

In anticipation

of these challenges, the legislature included in the revised
stalking statute a specific intent requirement, a reasonable
person standard, and concrete language which the ordinary person
would understand and would, therefore, be able to avoid so as not
to be criminally liable for stalking.

C.

Other States Have Upheld the Constitutionality of
Their Stalking Statutes By Denying Facial
Vagueness Challenges

Ohio, Alabama, Florida, Connecticut, Illinois, and Virginia
have all recently upheld their state's stalking statutes in the
face of constitutional challenges that the statutes are facially
vague.

See, City of Dayton v. Smith, 646 N.E. 2d 917 (Ohio Mun.

1994), Culbreath v. State, 1995 WL 217573 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995),
Pallas v. State, 636 So. 2d 1358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994),
State v. Culmor 642 A. 2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993), People V,
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Halt, 649 N.E. 2d 571 (111. App. Ct. 1995), Woolfolk v.

Commonwealth/ 447 S.E. 2d 530 (va. ct. App. 1994).
Many of the statutes withstanding these challenges contain
language considerably less concrete and specific than that in the
Utah Stalking Statute.

In light of the singular failure of

appellants in other states to prove their states1 stalking
statutes unconstitutional and the Utah Legislature's care in
drafting the Utah statute, it seems apparent that the Utah
statute can also withstand a vagueness challenge.

IV.

THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE UTAH CONSTITUTION THEREFORE IT IS NOT
INVALID FACIALLY NOR AS APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANT.
The Defendant has failed to meet his rather substantial

burden of proving the Utah Stalking Statute is either
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad in the face of its presumed
constitutionality.

Greenwood v. City of North Salt Lake, 817 P.

2d 816, 819 (Utah 1991).

Having failed to meet this burden, the

Defendant cannot allege that the statute violates the Due Process
and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Utah
Constitutions.

The statute is neither unconstitutionally broad

nor vague, therefore, the Defendant cannot allege that finding
him criminally liable under the Utah Stalking Statute violates
his equal protection or due process rights.

The Defendant does

not make any other showing that the statute was applied to him
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discriminatorily or unconstitutionally, therefore his claim for a
reversal of his conviction must fail.

CONCLUSION
The state has a significant interest in prohibiting its
citizens from conduct that causes another citizen to fear for
their physical safety or to suffer emotional distress.

The Utah

Stalking Statute was carefully drafted by the Utah Legislature to
protect citizens from repeated, unwanted contact or threats from
someone they fear might do them harm or causes them emotional
distress.
The statute does not proscribe constitutionally protected
activity nor coincidental contacts made during the course of
everyday life.

It requires the person charged with stalking to

act repeatedly with purpose, knowledge, and intent.

It requires

the conduct to be directed at a particular person and that that
person be reasonably fearful or distressed resulting from that
conduct.
In this case the Appellant has asked this Court to find the
statute he was convicted of violating unconstitutional because it
is overbroad and vague.

However, the Appellant has failed to

overcome the statute's presumption of validity by showing its
alleged overbreadth is "real and substantial" or that its
vagueness is such that the statute is invalid in all its
applications.

He has also failed to prove that his conduct had a

legitimate purpose and should not have been criminally proscribed
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by the legitimate confines of the statute.

This Court should,

therefore, deny the challenges to the Stalking Statute's
constitutionality and uphold the Appellant's conviction.

Respectfully submitted this

17

day of August, 1995,

GaryqcGij
for
Vernon F.l^(Rick) Romney
Attorney for Appellee

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certified that I mailed, postage prepaid, four (4)
copies of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee to Thomas H.
Means, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, at 43 East 200 North, PO
Box MLM, Provo, UT 84603-0200 this 1\*t day of August, 1995.
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ADDENDUM
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-106.5 (Repl. 1995)
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, Section 1
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Sections 7, 24
Judgment Granting Permanent Injunction, Kellie W. Rorina v. Frank
Lifang
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76-5-106.5

CRIMINAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq.

C.J.S. — 86 C.J.S. Threats & Unlawful Communications § 1.

76-5-106.5. Definitions — Crime of stalking.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Course of conduct" means repeatedly maintaining a visual or
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written
threats or threats implied by conduct or a combination thereof directed at
or toward a person.
(b) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any
other person who regularly resides in the household or who regularly
resided in the household within the prior six months.
(c) "Repeatedly" means on two or more occasions.
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who:
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at
a specific person that would cause a reasonable person:
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate
family; or
(ii) to suffer emotional distress;
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person:
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a
member of his immediate family; or
(ii) will suffer emotional distress; and
(c) whose conduct:
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or
a member of his immediate family; or
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person.
(3) Stalking is a class B misdemeanor.
(4) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking;
(b) has been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is
substantially similar to the offense of stalking; or
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any
crime in another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony,
in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony
offense.
(5) Stalking is a felony of the third degree if the offender:
(a) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of
stalking;
(b) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or
jurisdictions of offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of
stalking;
(c) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of
offenses under Subsections (5)(a) and (b); or
(d) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in
Utah or of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if
committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking
was also a victim of the previous felony offenses.
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
History: C. 1953, 76-5-106.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 188, § 1; 1994, ch. 206, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsections (1) and (2) to such an extent that a

76-5-107,

76-5-107.5

detailed comparison is impracticable and added
Subsections (4) and (5)
Effective Dates. — Laws 1992, ch 188
became effective on April 27, 1992, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art VI, Sec 25

Threat against life or property — Penalty.

(1) A person commits a threat against life or property if he threatens to
commit any offense involving violence with intent to:
(a) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency
organized to deal with emergencies;
(b) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury; or
(c) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or room; place of
assembly; place to which the public has access; or aircraft, automobile, or
other form of transportation.
(2) A threat against life or property is a class B misdemeanor, except if the
actor's intent is to prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building, a place to
which the public has access, or a facility of public transportation operated by
a common carrier, the offense is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-107, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-107; 1988, ch. 38, § 1.
Cross-References. — Bus Passenger Safety

Act, hijacking, bombing and other offenses,
§§ 76-10-1501 to 76-10-1511.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31A Am. Jur 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 57 et seq
C.J.S. — 86 C J.S Threats & Unlawful Communications § 1.

A.L.R. — Validity and construction of terroristic threat statutes, 45 A.L.R.4th 949.

76-5-107.5. Prohibition of "hazing" — Definitions — Penalties.
(1) "Hazing" means any action or situation that, for the purpose of initiation,
admission into, affiliation with, or as a condition for continued membership in
any organization:
(a) recklessly or intentionally endangers the mental or physical health
or safety of any person;
(b) willfully destroys or removes public or private property;
(c) involves any brutality of a physical nature such as whipping,
beating, branding, forced calisthenics, or exposure to the elements;
(d) involves forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug, or other
substance or any other forced physical activity that could adversely affect
the physical health and safety of the individual;
(e) involves any activity that would subject the individual to extreme
mental stress, such as sleep deprivation, forced exclusion from social
contact, forced conduct that could result in extreme embarrassment, or
any other forced activity that could adversely affect the mental health or
dignity of the individual; or
(f) involves brutality toward or willful mistreatment of any animal.
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A M E N D M E N T 14
Section 1.

Citizens of the United States.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
10

Art. I, § 6

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Abjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=»
83(1), 121 to 123.

Sec. 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
J.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law «=> 82;
Weapons *» 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
project did not unconstitutionally grant benefits to private individuals; any benefits were
strictly incidental to the public purpose of ter-

Art. I, § 24

mination of urban blight. Tribe v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 540 R2d 499 (Utah 1975).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am. Jur. 2d Franchises
§§ 9 to 23.

C.J.S. — 37 C.J.S. Franchises § 26.
Key Numbers. — Franchises «=> 11.

Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Prohibition on pri-

vate or special laws, Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec.
26.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
Age of majority.
Agent for service of process.
Automobile license law.
Construction with Art. VI, § 26.
Contract carrier permit.
Cosmetologists* license law.
Criminal actions.
—Investigations.
—Prosecution.
—Sentence.
Criminal sentence.
Disparate tax assessments.
Excess revenue refunds.
Guest statutes.
Inheritance Tax Law.
Insurance premium tax exemption.
Intoxicating liquor.
Licenses.
Massage parlor ordinance.
Municipal employment prerequisites.
Notice requirements.
Property.
—Responsibility for water service.
Public employees' retirement system.
Public officers' bonds.
Public officers' salaries.
Road poll tax.
School activities.
Search warrants.
Sunday closing laws.
Tax sales.
Unfair Practices Act.
In general.
All laws shall operate uniformly wherever
uniform laws can be enacted. State v.
Holtgreve, 58 Utah 563, 200 P. 894, 26 A.L.R.
696 (1921).
Objects and purposes of law present touchstone for determining proper and improper

classifications. State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78
P.2d 920,117 A.L.R. 330 (1938); State v. J.B. &
R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
(1941).
One who assails legislative classification as
arbitrary has burden of proving it to be such.
State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Classification is never unreasonable or arbitrary in its inclusion or exclusion features so
long as there is some basis for differentiation
between classes or subject matters included, as
compared to those excluded, provided differentiation bears reasonable relation to purposes of
act. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah
523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Before legislative enactment can be interfered with, court must be able to say that there
is no fair reason for the law that would not
require equally its extension to those which it
leaves untouched. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Only where some persons or transactions excluded from operation of law are, as to the subject matter of the law, in no differentiable class
from those included in its operation, is the law
discriminatory in the sense of being arbitrary
and unconstitutional, and if reasonable basis
to differentiate can be found, law must be held
constitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker,
Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766 (1941).
Inability of legislature to make perfect classification does not render statute unconstitutional. State v. J.B. & R.E. Walker, Inc., 100
Utah 523, 116 P 2d 766 (1941).
In determining whether classification made
by legislature is unconstitutional, discrimination is very essence of classification and is not
objectionable unless founded upon unreasonable distinctions. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
113 Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464 (1948).
An act is never unconstitutional because of
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H. Mifflin Williams III, #3489
KING & ISAACSON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
A Professional Corporation
4 Triad Center, Suite 825
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-1700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KELLIE W. RORING,
Plaintiff,
vs.
FRANK LIFANG,

)
)
)

JUDGMENT GRANTING
PERMANENT INJUNCTION

)

Civil No. 940901302CV

) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Defendant.

)

Plaintiff in the above-entitled case, commenced an action in
the above-entitled Court against the above-named defendant
praying that defendant refrain from certain acts complained in
the Complaint, and more particularly set forth herein.
A Temporary Restraining Order was given by order of this
Court, made and entered on February 24, 1994.

Because it was not

possible to personally serve the defendant with the Temporary
Restraining Order issued on said date, a Second Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the Court on March 4, 1994, and
defendant was personally served with said Second Temporary Restraining Order as well as Summons and Complaint on March 7, 1994.
The defendant, having been informed of his right to seek
legal representation through an attorney of his choice, has
entered his appearance herein and waived the statutory time in

which to answer or otherwise respond to plaintiff's Complaint,
and has consented that Judgment by Default may be entered against
him at any time and without further notice to him.
Further, by his Appearance and Consent on file herein, the
defendant has agreed that he will not bother, harass, annoy,
threaten or harm the plaintiff at her place of residence,
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and he
has agreed to not to come in, on, or around the plaintiffs
residence, place of employment or any place where plaintiff may
be present.
By his Appearance and Consent, defendant has agreed that he
may be permanently enjoined from bothering, harassing, annoying,
threatening or harming the plaintiff at her place of residence,
employment or any other place in person or by telephone, and that
he may be restrained from coming in, on, or around the
plaintiff's residence, place of employment or any place where
plaintiff may be present.
In additon, in his Appearance and Consent, the defendant has
acknowledged that any appropriate peace officer shall render any
necessary assistance to the plaintiff and that violations of any
of the provisions of this permanent injunction may be deemed
contemptuous and that the defendant could be punished
accordingly.
Based upon the above and upon the Court's review of all the
papers in this file, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises, and because of the irreparable harm which plaintiff
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could suffer if the defendant were to "get even" and carry out
other threats he has made as set forth in the Complaint and
plaintiffs Affidavit on file herein,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the defendant,
Frank Lifang, is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from
bothering, harassing, annoying, threatening or harming the
plaintiff at her place of residence, employment or any other
place in person or by telephone, and said defendant, Frank
Lifang, is permanently enjoined from coming in, on, or around the
plaintiff's residence, place of employment, or any place where
plaintiff my be present; and in regard to this permanent
injunction, any appropriate peace officer shall render any
necessary assistance to the plaintiff*
Violation of any of the provisions mentioned herein may be
deemed contemptuous and the defendant could be punished
accordingly.
This Judgment granting permanent injunction shall be binding
upon the parties to this action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in
active concert or participation with them who receive notice, in
person or through counsel, or otherwise, of this Judgment
Granting Permanent Injunction.
DATED this

(

day of March, 1994.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the iC4U day of March, 1994, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Granting
Permanent Injunction was mailed to the defendant, Frank Lifang,
at 650 North Atlantis Drive, Orem, Utah 84057, by placing the
same in the United States mails, postage prepaid.
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